Arbeitspapier

Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers

Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 542

Classification
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subject
Mergers & Acquisitions
Event Studies
Antitrust
Coalition Formation
Fusion
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Börsenkurs
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
Stennek, Johan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
  • Stennek, Johan
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Time of origin

  • 2000

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