Arbeitspapier
Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers
Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 542
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Subject
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Mergers & Acquisitions
Event Studies
Antitrust
Coalition Formation
Fusion
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Börsenkurs
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
Stennek, Johan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (where)
-
Stockholm
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
- Stennek, Johan
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Time of origin
- 2000