Arbeitspapier
An axiomatization of minimal curb sets
Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 589
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Minimal curb sets
Consistency
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Axiomatisierung
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Voorneveld, Mark
Kets, Willemien
Norde, Henk
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (where)
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Stockholm
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Voorneveld, Mark
- Kets, Willemien
- Norde, Henk
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Time of origin
- 2005
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