Arbeitspapier
Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassication approach
In this paper, we consider nonparametric identification and estimation of first-price auction models when N*, the number of potential bidders, is unknown to the researcher, but observed by bidders. Exploiting results from the recent econometric literature on models with misclassification error, we develop a nonparametric procedure for recovering the distribution of bids conditional on the unknown N*. Monte Carlo results illustrate that the procedure works well in practice. We present illustrative evidence from a dataset of procurement auctions, which shows that accounting for the unobservability of N* can lead to economically meaningful differences in the estimates of bidders' profit margins.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 541
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hu, Yingyao
Shum, Matthew
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Baltimore, MD
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hu, Yingyao
- Shum, Matthew
- The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007
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