Arbeitspapier

Renegotiations in public-private partnerships: Theory and evidence

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have the potential to increase efficiency and improve resource allocation. However, contract renegotiations are common and make us question the benefits to PPPs. Under current accounting standards, PPPs allow intertemporal reallocations of infrastructure spending that do not occur under traditional methods of procuring infrastructure and which allow governments to escape the constraints of congressional purview. We review the theoretical results in Engel et al. [2009a] as well as data from Colombia, Chile and Peru, comprising 610 highway PPPs and 540 renegotiations processes to verify these predictions. The data and original analysis comes from Bitran et al. [2013], complemented with additional descriptive statistics. The empirical evidence supports the predictions of the theoretical model.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: International Transport Forum Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Economics of Regulation
Transportation: General
Thema
Build-operate-and-transfer
concessions
lowballing

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Engel, Eduardo
Fischer, Ronald
Galetovic, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Transport Forum
(wo)
Paris
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Engel, Eduardo
  • Fischer, Ronald
  • Galetovic, Alexander
  • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Transport Forum

Entstanden

  • 2014

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