Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory

Arbeitspapier

The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 778

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
• Thema: Rational voter model ; Multicandidate elections ; Plurality ; Aggregate ; Abstimmungsregel ; Wahlverhalten ; Condorcet-Paradoxon ; Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit ; Test

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bouton, Laurent ; Castanheira, Micael ; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130792
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ