Aggregate uncertainty, political instability and redistribution

Arbeitspapier

This paper associates political instability to real shocks affecting the income of the median voter, in a two-period model where two political parties set redistribution in order to defend the interests of well-de¯ned constituencies. Implemented policies affect future voting outcomes and an intertemporal trade-off arises for the parties since their optimal one-period strategy does not maximize the probability of being reelected. The higher the volatility of the real shock, the more likely that parties deviate from the optimal one-period strategy by choosing a conservative strategy, which increases their chances of reelection and the expected lifetime utility of their constituencies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 213

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bellettini, Giorgio
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (wo): Bologna
• (wann): 1995

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5113
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159056
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ