Arbeitspapier

Progressive Taxation in a Tournament Economy

Not enough is known about the responsiveness of individuals, in particular those who tend to work under different incentives, to changes in marginal tax rates. We ask whether changes in marginal tax rates are less distortionary for workers engaged in a contest. To examine this potential rationale for a more progressive tax code, we first model the effort decisions of workers faced with progressive taxation under tournaments and piece rates. Because of the difficulty identifying any distortion that may be induced by the tax code in naturally occurring data, we then report on the results of a real-effort experiment based on this model. Consistent with a behavioral approach to public finance, we find that tournament workers are less sensitive, and conclude with a tentative evaluation of the welfare benefits of progressive taxation in tournament economies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8369

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Public Goods
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
taxation
tournaments
public good
real effort experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
Matthews, Peter Hans
Tabb, Benjamin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
  • Matthews, Peter Hans
  • Tabb, Benjamin
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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