After the Tournament: Outcomes and Effort Provision

Arbeitspapier

Modeling the incentive effects of competitions among employees for promotions or financial rewards, economists have largely ignored the effects of competition on effort provision once the competition is finished. In a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition outcomes affect the provision of post-competition effort. We find that subjects who lose arbitrarily decided competitions choose lower subsequent effort levels than subjects who lose competitions decided by their effort choices. We explore the preferences underlying this behavior and show that subjects' reactions are related to their preferences for meritocratic outcomes.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7759

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: General ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
• Thema: tournaments ; counterproductive behavior ; promotions ; experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): McGee, Andrew ; McGee, Peter
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89889
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ