Reference points and effort provision

Arbeitspapier

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2585

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Expectations; Speculations ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply
• Subject: Reference points ; expectations ; loss aversion ; risk aversion ; disappointment ; experiment ; Leistungsmotivation ; Erwartungstheorie ; Präferenztheorie ; Risikoaversion ; Verlust ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Abeler, Johannes ; Falk, Armin ; Götte, Lorenz ; Huffman, David
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26630
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET