Arbeitspapier
Antitrust Guidelines: A Simple Operational Method for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers
We reexamine the profitability and social efficiency of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly with decreasing average costs. Assuming the merger allows for efficiency gains in production, we identify the conditions under which the merger is, respectively, profitable and socially desirable. The economic preditions of the model are contrasted with FTC guidelines, based on a simple method that allows to forecast the economic consequances of a merger in terms of ex ante observables. This comparative assessment highlights the existence of well defined parameter regions where FTC guidelines lead to systematic errors.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 591
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2007
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4692
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dragone, Davide
- Lambertini, Luca
- Mantovani, Andrea
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2007
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Size Distribution and Anti-trust
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Capital Accumulation and Horizontal Mergers in Differential Oligopoly Games
The Profitability of Small Horizontal Mergers with Nonlinear Demand Functions
Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox
Horizontal Mergers with Scale Economies
Monopoly à la Hotelling
International Trade and Spatial Competition
On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation
Quantum Mechanics and Mathematical Economics are Isomorphic. John von Neumann between Physics and Economics
Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand and Capital Accumulation
Forward Induction in Arms Races
Size Distribution and Anti-trust
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Capital Accumulation and Horizontal Mergers in Differential Oligopoly Games
The Profitability of Small Horizontal Mergers with Nonlinear Demand Functions
Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox
Horizontal Mergers with Scale Economies
Monopoly à la Hotelling
International Trade and Spatial Competition
On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation
Quantum Mechanics and Mathematical Economics are Isomorphic. John von Neumann between Physics and Economics
Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand and Capital Accumulation
Forward Induction in Arms Races
Size Distribution and Anti-trust
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Capital Accumulation and Horizontal Mergers in Differential Oligopoly Games
The Profitability of Small Horizontal Mergers with Nonlinear Demand Functions
Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox
Horizontal Mergers with Scale Economies
Monopoly à la Hotelling
International Trade and Spatial Competition
On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation
Quantum Mechanics and Mathematical Economics are Isomorphic. John von Neumann between Physics and Economics
Oligopoly with Hyperbolic Demand and Capital Accumulation