Arbeitspapier
Horizontal Mergers with Scale Economies
We examine the profitability and social efficiency of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly with decreasing average costs. Assuming the merger allows for a reduction in the total amount of fixed costs, we identify the conditions under which the merger is, respectively, profitable and socially desirable. There exists an admissible parameter range wherein the merger is socially convenient but not profitable. In such a case, the policy maker may induce firms to merge through subsidies financed via a lump sum tax.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 571
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Fusion
Oligopol
Skalenertrag
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2006
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4716
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dragone, Davide
- Lambertini, Luca
- Mantovani, Andrea
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2006
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Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation
Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Antitrust Guidelines: A Simple Operational Method for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers
Bidimensional quality competition and scope economies
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On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Capital Accumulation and Horizontal Mergers in Differential Oligopoly Games
The Profitability of Small Horizontal Mergers with Nonlinear Demand Functions
Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox
Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation
Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Antitrust Guidelines: A Simple Operational Method for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers
Bidimensional quality competition and scope economies
Monopoly à la Hotelling
International Trade and Spatial Competition
On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation
Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition
Capital Accumulation and Horizontal Mergers in Differential Oligopoly Games
The Profitability of Small Horizontal Mergers with Nonlinear Demand Functions
Horizontal Mergers with Capital Adjustments: Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox
Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation
Endogenous Choice Between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
On the Dichotomy between Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation
Antitrust Guidelines: A Simple Operational Method for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers
Bidimensional quality competition and scope economies
Monopoly à la Hotelling
International Trade and Spatial Competition