Arbeitspapier
Collusion with private and aggregate information
This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative consumer, (ii) horizontal differentiation and (iii) vertical differentiation. We show that firms could maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information. They can choose the “correct“ colluding prices without knowing the demand or profit function. The collusive outcome is a natural focal point despite firms are asymmetric. Collusion can be incentive compatible even though individual actions (prices) are not observed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 99-10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jin, Jim Y.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jin, Jim Y.
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 1999
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