Arbeitspapier
Collusion with private and aggregate information
This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative consumer, (ii) horizontal differentiation and (iii) vertical differentiation. We show that firms could maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information. They can choose the “correct“ colluding prices without knowing the demand or profit function. The collusive outcome is a natural focal point despite firms are asymmetric. Collusion can be incentive compatible even though individual actions (prices) are not observed.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 99-10
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Jin, Jim Y.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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1999
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Jin, Jim Y.
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 1999
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