The politics of opinion assignment: a conditional logit model with varying choice set

Abstract: "This note replicates and extends Chapter 2 of Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs and Paul J. Wahlbeck's (henceforth: MSW) "Crafting Law on the Supreme Court" (2000). Using a conditional logit model, the authors test the effects of both choice-specific and chooser-specific variables on majority opinion assignment on the United States Supreme Court during Chief Justice Burger's tenure. The authors find that the effect of ideology, as well as other variables, is conditioned on both case facts as well as justices' attributes. In this note, we take issue with the authors' specification of the model, specifically their failure to include choicespecific, i.e. the justices, constants. Below we argue for the statistical necessity of the inclusion of these controls and reassess the original theoretical model with the appropriate statistical specification. We first show that the failure to include these constants will yield biased estimates. We then test if the authors' substantive findings

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource, 17 S.
• Sprache: Englisch
• Anmerkungen: unbekannt

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2002
• Urheber: Gschwend, Thomas ; King, Chad M.
• Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen: Universität Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES)

Weitere Informationen

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-430858
• Rechteinformation: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 25.03.2025, 13:56 MEZ