Strategic abuse and accuser credibility

Arbeitspapier

We study the interaction between a potential offender's (principal ) incentive to commit crimes and the potential victims' (agents) incentive to report crime. The probability of crime and the credibility of reports are endogenously determined in equilibrium, and the principal is convicted if found sufficiently likely of having committed crime by a Bayesian judge. We show that when the punishment in case of a conviction is sufficiently large, the principal's decisions to commit crimes are strategic substitutes, while the agents' decisions to report crime are strategic complements. The tension between agents' coordination motive and the negative correlation of their private information causes their reports to become arbitrarily uninformative in equilibrium and lead to a significant probability of crime. The occurrence of crime and lack of report credibility can be mitigated by reducing the punishment to a convicted principal or by rewarding lone accusers.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0145

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Subject: communication informativeness ; coordination ; negative correlation ; information aggregation ; law enforcement

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Di Pei, Harry ; Strulovici, Bruno
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/213452
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET