Arbeitspapier
The Credibility of Certifiers
It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a commitment problem: The certifier offers inflated certificates if the costs of offering the first inflated certificate are lower than the sellers' willingness-to-pay for it. However, in equilibrium, the buyers cannot be fooled. The certifier would hence make a higher profit if the certifier did not offer inflated certificates and the buyers believed it. The number of inflated certificates, which the certifier offers in equilibrium, depends on the costs of offering inflated certificates. Yet, the certifier may oppose an increase in the costs of offering inflated certificates. We show that whether a certifier welcomes tighter regulation or lobbies against it, may depend on whether the new regulation only imposes higher costs, or also reduces the certifier's commitment problem significantly.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2011-21
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Auditing
- Thema
-
Certification
commitment problem
credibility
Standardisierung
Glaubwürdigkeit
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Kosten
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stolper, Anno
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.12523
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-12523-9
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stolper, Anno
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
On the Credibility of Currency Boards
The credibility of central bank announcements
The credibility of the monetary policy "free lunch"
The Credibility of the Federal Reserve's Monetary Targets
Increasing the credibility of the twin birth instrument
Credibility for Sale
Credibility For Sale
Incomplete information, credibility and the Core
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
Credibility of central banks inflation forecasts
The retention effect of training: Portability, visibility, and credibility
Practical Significance, Meta-Analysis and the Credibility of Economics
On the Credibility of Currency Boards
The credibility of central bank announcements
The credibility of the monetary policy "free lunch"
The Credibility of the Federal Reserve's Monetary Targets
Increasing the credibility of the twin birth instrument
Credibility for Sale
Credibility For Sale
Incomplete information, credibility and the Core
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
Credibility of central banks inflation forecasts
The retention effect of training: Portability, visibility, and credibility
Practical Significance, Meta-Analysis and the Credibility of Economics
On the Credibility of Currency Boards
The credibility of central bank announcements
The credibility of the monetary policy "free lunch"
The Credibility of the Federal Reserve's Monetary Targets
Increasing the credibility of the twin birth instrument
Credibility for Sale
Credibility For Sale
Incomplete information, credibility and the Core
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
Credibility of central banks inflation forecasts
The retention effect of training: Portability, visibility, and credibility