Arbeitspapier
The credibility of central bank announcements
In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2002/09
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
monetary policy
private information
announcements
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hoeberichts, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-9992
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hoeberichts, Marco
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Entstanden
- 2002
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