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The credibility of central bank announcements

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In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2002/09

Classification: Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies

Subject: monetary policy
private information
announcements

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Hoeberichts, Marco

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

(where): Frankfurt a. M.

(when): 2002

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25385

URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-9992

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Hoeberichts, Marco
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Time of origin

2002

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