Credibility and reputation in peacemaking

Arbeitspapier

The paper analyses credibility and reputation in the context of peace negotiations. Where war provides economic gains to one side, peace is not incentive compatible, and peace agreements will necessarily degenerate, as they become time inconsistent. Levels of conflict are an increasing function of greed and rents, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. In a multiple period framework there is some uncertainty regarding the type of negotiator and for high values of the discount rate more conflict is chosen. Sanctions, aid and direct intervention, if effective, could eliminate conflict, as well as help in devising commitment technologies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2001/45

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economic Development: General ; Economywide Country Studies: Africa
• Thema: peace agreements ; credibility ; reputation ; conflict ; aid ; Frieden ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Glaubwürdigkeit ; Reputation ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Addison, Tony ; Murshed, S. Mansoob
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (wo): Helsinki
• (wann): 2001

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53010
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ