Arbeitspapier
Competition, Reputation and Compliance
This paper displays a linear demand oligopoly model, in which firms endogenously decide whether to enter the market and whether to specialize on high or low quality products, and then repeatedly interact to sell experience goods. It shows that the intuition that low and rising prices grant compliance with quality promises extends to this setting, provided that high quality is sufficiently important to buyers.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 682
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Vanin, Paolo
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
-
2009
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4562
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Vanin, Paolo
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2009
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