Disability insurance screening and worker outcomes

Arbeitspapier

We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force participation, program spillovers, and worker health. To do so, we analyze workers after an acute workplace injury that experience differential levels of application screening. We find that when workers face stricter screening requirements, they are less likely to claim disability and are more likely to remain in the labor force. We observe no differences in any physical or mental health outcomes. Our findings imply that imposing stricter DI screening has large fiscal benefits but does not yield any detectable health costs, on the margin.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2301

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Demographic Economics: Public Policy ; Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
• Thema: disability insurance ; retirement ; health

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ahammer, Alexander ; Packham, Analisa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
• (wo): Linz
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/278297
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ