Medical Screening and Award Errors in Disability Insurance

Konferenzbeitrag

This paper investigates the impact of medical screening on individual disability insurance benefit receipt. Using a unique policy change in Switzerland, I assess the size of award errors in disability insurance and show that improvements in medical screening can substantially reduce insurance inflow. In the absence of explicit medical screening, wrongful admissions dominate rejection errors and account for at least 14% of insurance inflow. Misclassification is tied to difficult-to-diagnose conditions, indicating inaccurate assessments by general practitioners. Reductions in full pension benefit awards are potentially substituted in part by increases in partial benefit awards.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Social Policy ; No. G14-V2

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Liebert, Helge
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113224
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ