Screening disability insurance applications

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in two of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Stricter screening seems to improve targeting efficiency, without inducing negative spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. The costs of stricter screening are only a small fraction of the monetary benefits.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2006:15

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Retirement; Retirement Policies ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Thema: Disability insurance ; experiment ; policy evaluation ; sickness absenteeism ; self-screening ; Behindertenpolitik ; Behinderte Arbeitskräfte ; Versicherung ; Fehlzeit ; Kontrolle ; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse ; Niederlande

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): de Jong, Philip ; Lindeboom, Maarten ; van der Klaauw, Bas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78674
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ