Arbeitspapier
Tax Me If You Can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax between Competing Governments
We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasilinear in income. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium, extending the Diamond-Saez formula. The theory and numerical simulations on the US case show that the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration on which we lack empirical evidence are crucial to derive the shape of optimal marginal income tax. Our simulations show that potential migrations result in a welfare drop between 0.4% and 5.3% for the worst-off and an average gain between 18.9% and 29.3% for the top 1%.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7646
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- Thema
-
optimal income tax
income tax competition
migration
labor mobility
Nash-equilibrium tax schedules
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lehmann, Etienne
Simula, Laurent
Trannoy, Alain
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lehmann, Etienne
- Simula, Laurent
- Trannoy, Alain
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Tax Me If You Can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax between Competing Governments
Do governments tax agglomeration rents?
Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans
Do Local Governments Tax Homeowner Communities Differently?
Do local governments tax homeowner communities differently?
Do local governments tax homeowner communities differently?
Tax Havens in a World of Competing Countries
Arbitrage and nonlinear tax scales
A Critique of Competing Plans for Radical Tax Restructuring
Sub-national governments' tax structure in the EU countries
Multijurisdictional firms and governments' strategies under alternative tax designs
Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments
Tax Me If You Can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax between Competing Governments
Do governments tax agglomeration rents?
Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans
Do Local Governments Tax Homeowner Communities Differently?
Do local governments tax homeowner communities differently?
Do local governments tax homeowner communities differently?
Tax Havens in a World of Competing Countries
Arbitrage and nonlinear tax scales
A Critique of Competing Plans for Radical Tax Restructuring
Sub-national governments' tax structure in the EU countries
Multijurisdictional firms and governments' strategies under alternative tax designs
Stable and sustainable global tax coordination with Leviathan governments
Tax Me If You Can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax between Competing Governments
Do governments tax agglomeration rents?
Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans
Do Local Governments Tax Homeowner Communities Differently?
Do local governments tax homeowner communities differently?
Do local governments tax homeowner communities differently?
Tax Havens in a World of Competing Countries
Arbitrage and nonlinear tax scales
A Critique of Competing Plans for Radical Tax Restructuring
Sub-national governments' tax structure in the EU countries
Multijurisdictional firms and governments' strategies under alternative tax designs