Konferenzbeitrag

Do Local Governments Tax Homeowner Communities Differently?

Using data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census and historical war damages as a source of exogenous variation in local homeownership, we provide evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their population is higher. The result is independent of local market conditions, suggesting tax salience as key mechanism. We find positive spatial dependence in tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Taxation III ; No. C19-V3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lerbs, Oliver
Füss, Roland
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel, Hamburg
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Lerbs, Oliver
  • Füss, Roland
  • ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2017

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