Arbeitspapier
Shared state taxes and tax policy of local self-governments in connection with tax morale
Based on our assumption, tax morale significantly depends on a country's legal, historical, social and cultural background and circumstances. In the first part of the paper, we discuss the legal dimension of the tax morale - including the interconnection of law, ethics and moral. Furthermore, we analyze the facts breaching tax liabilities under the scope of the criminal law and the actions violating the tax morale but not qualified as infringement of the criminal law. In the second part of the paper, we provide empirical evidences which factors (e.g. personal characteristics, commitment for paying local taxes, knowledge about the distribution of paid taxes between central and local authorities, etc.) determine significantly the individual level of tax morale. The paper discusses these complex connections either from the viewpoint of law or economics in order to find out whether it is possible to develop the tax morale of individuals, or can the legislator adequately rule the different forms of tax evasion.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Institute of Economic Research Working Papers ; No. 101/2015
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Subject
-
tax morale
legal morale
tax regime
tax system
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Sipos, Agnes
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Economic Research (IER)
- (where)
-
Toruń
- (when)
-
2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sipos, Agnes
- Institute of Economic Research (IER)
Time of origin
- 2015
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