Artikel
Agency equilibrium
Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of incomplete information to model such situations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-15 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
agency
equilibrium
individualism
collectivism
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Newton, Jonathan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
MDPI
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3390/g10010014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Newton, Jonathan
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2019
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