Artikel

On adaptive heuristics that converge to correlated equilibrium

I study the path properties of adaptive heuristics that mimic the natural dynamics of play in a game and converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Despite their apparent differences, I show that these heuristics have an abstract representation as a sequence of probability distributions that satisfy a number of common properties. These properties arise due to the topological structure of the set of correlated equilibria. The characterizations that I obtain have useful applications in the study of the convergence of the heuristics.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 11- ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
adaptive heuristics
correlated equilibrium
convergence
repeated games
algorithmic play

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bhattacharya, Ayan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3390/g10010006
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Bhattacharya, Ayan
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2019

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