Artikel
Agency equilibrium
Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of incomplete information to model such situations.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-15 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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agency
equilibrium
individualism
collectivism
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Newton, Jonathan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g10010014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Newton, Jonathan
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2019
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