Artikel
Ideal reactive equilibrium
Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more mathematically-complicated limitations on permitted beliefs. A simpler approach is taken here, where the whole idea of beliefs is dispensed with, and a new equilibrium concept, called the ideal reactive equilibrium, that builds on some pioneering work by Amershi, Sadanand and Sadanand on thought process dynamics, is developed.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-18 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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refinements of Nash equilibrium
dynamic games
imperfect information
beliefs
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Sadanand, Asha B.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g10020019
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Sadanand, Asha B.
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2019
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