Arbeitspapier
R&D spillovers throught RJV cooperation
We investigate the dimensions through which R&D spillovers are propagated across firms via cooperation through Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We build on the framework developed by Bloom et al. (2013) which considers the opposing effects of technology spillovers and product market rivalry, and extend it to account for RJVs. Our main findings are that the adverse effects of product market rivalry are mitigated if firms cooperate in RJVs and that R&D spending is reduced among technologically close RJV participants.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1887
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Antitrust Law
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- Subject
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spillovers
R&D
research joint ventures
market value
patents
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Banal-Estañol, Albert
Duso, Tomaso
Seldeslachts, Jo
Szücs, Florian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2020
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Banal-Estañol, Albert
- Duso, Tomaso
- Seldeslachts, Jo
- Szücs, Florian
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Time of origin
- 2020
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On the politics of the regulatory reform: econometric evidence from the OECD countries
Who decides to regulate? Lobbying activity in the US cellular industry
Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: evidence from the US cellular industry
Collusion through joint R&D: An empirical assessment
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On the politics of the regulatory reform: econometric evidence from the OECD countries