Arbeitspapier

Student Loans: When is Risk Sharing Desirable?

In higher education, pure credit market funding leads to underinvestment due to insufficient risk pooling, while pure income-contingent loan funding leads to overinvestment. We analyze whether funding diversity – a market structure in which credit markets coexist alongside income-contingent loan funding – might restore efficiency of the educational investment process. In the absence of government intervention, we find that funding diversity improves pooling of individual income risks and, under some condition, leads to higher social welfare than pure credit market funding. If combined with a policy that restricts access to higher education, funding diversity even achieves full investment efficiency and strictly dominates credit market funding.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5718

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Thema
higher education
funding diversity
human capital formation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Eckwert, Bernhard
Zilcha, Itzhak
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Eckwert, Bernhard
  • Zilcha, Itzhak
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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