Arbeitspapier
Crowdsourcing government accountability: Experimental evidence from Pakistan
We develop and implement a novel, mobile phone-based information clearinghouse, and experimentally evaluate its ability to overcome information asymmetries and improve public service delivery to farmers in Punjab, Pakistan. Like many crowdsourcing websites, our clearinghouse collects and disseminates ratings - here, on the success of government veterinarians in inseminating livestock. We find that, compared to control, farmers receiving ratings enjoy 27 percent higher insemination success. This effect is entirely due to increased veterinarian effort, rather than farmers switching veterinarians. Treatment farmers are also 33 percent more likely to return to a government veterinarian rather than seeking a private provider. These results suggest large welfare benefits from a low-cost information intervention, which holds out hope for improved government accountability for the poor using basic mobile technology.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: GEG Working Paper ; No. 123
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hasanain, Ali
Khan, Yasir
Rezaee, Arman
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Oxford, Global Economic Governance Programme (GEG)
- (wo)
-
Oxford
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hasanain, Ali
- Khan, Yasir
- Rezaee, Arman
- University of Oxford, Global Economic Governance Programme (GEG)
Entstanden
- 2016
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