Arbeitspapier
An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions
This paper investigates empirically a number of hypotheses that are related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions for train tickets. The data set is ideal for analyzing competing auctions since each ticket is sold in a separate auction and all auctions with identical tickets starts and ends at exactly the same time. The results unambiguously demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between efficiency and price uniformity on the one hand and the number of submitted cross-bids on the other hand. These findings are in line with what theory suggests.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010:14
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Auctions
- Subject
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Competing auctions
Cross-bidding
Efficiency
Price uniformity
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Andersson, Tommy
Andersson, Christer
Andersson, Fredrik N. G.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Lund
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Andersson, Tommy
- Andersson, Christer
- Andersson, Fredrik N. G.
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2010
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