Artikel
Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices freely. An important outstanding conjecture (e.g. Peters and Severinov (1997)) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This conjecture is confirmed in this paper. More precisely, we show that if all sellers have zero costs, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 in distribution. I also show that if there is a high enough lower bound on the buyers’ valuations, then there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, if the number of buyers (sellers) increases, then the equilibrium reserve price increases (decreases) and the reserve price is decreasing in the size of the market.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 241-274 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Competing auctions
finite markets
convergence
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Virág, Gábor
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2010
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE538
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Virág, Gábor
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2010
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