Arbeitspapier

The Role of Limit Pricing in Sequential Entry Models

In this paper we establish a complete characterization of the strategic interaction of firms in sequential entry models. The limit price plays an important coordinating role in non-cooperative sequential entry models. We show that for many firms in a large range of sequential entry equilibria, the limit price is effectively parametric, so that firms make investment decisions in a quasi-competitive manner. Entry deterrence is only pursued by firms at the beginning of the sequence if it is profitable; otherwise it is delegated to the last firms to enter.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 836

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Church, Jeffrey
Ware, Roger
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(where)
Kingston (Ontario)
(when)
1991

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Church, Jeffrey
  • Ware, Roger
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1991

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