Arbeitspapier
The Role of Limit Pricing in Sequential Entry Models
In this paper we establish a complete characterization of the strategic interaction of firms in sequential entry models. The limit price plays an important coordinating role in non-cooperative sequential entry models. We show that for many firms in a large range of sequential entry equilibria, the limit price is effectively parametric, so that firms make investment decisions in a quasi-competitive manner. Entry deterrence is only pursued by firms at the beginning of the sequence if it is profitable; otherwise it is delegated to the last firms to enter.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 836
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Church, Jeffrey
Ware, Roger
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
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1991
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Church, Jeffrey
- Ware, Roger
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1991