Arbeitspapier
Economic Analysis of Constitutions
This paper is a preliminary draft of an article to appear in Chicago Law Review (2000), as part of a symposium reviewing two new books on economic analysis of constitutions: Dennis Mueller's Constitutional Democracy and Robert Cooter's Strategic Constitution. Some of the basic questions of constitutional analysis are introduced, and the importance of work in this area is shown as one of the major new developments in social theory. The methods of economic theory are then shown to be particularly appropriate and useful for such constitutional analysis. The author then tries to follow Cooter and Mueller in sketching some of the most important results of economic analysis of constitutional structures, but finds a perspective quite different from theirs.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1291
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Myerson, Roger B.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.0088, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Myerson, Roger B.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2000
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