Arbeitspapier

Constitutions and social networks

The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players' preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 59.2015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Thema
Social Networks
Constitutions
Stability
Many-to-Many Matchings

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mauleon, Ana
Roehl, Nils
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mauleon, Ana
  • Roehl, Nils
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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