Arbeitspapier
The provision point mechanism with reward money
We introduce reward money into the provision point mechanism with refunds. Reward money is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only when the provision point is not reached. In environments without aggregate uncertainty, the provision point is always reached in equilibrium as competition for reward money and preference for the public good induce sufficient contributions. Importantly, the mechanism not only ensures allocative efficiency but also distributional. At a specific level of reward money, we obtain a unique equilibrium, where all consumers contribute the same proportion of their private valuations. The advantages of the mechanism are also demonstrated for collective action problems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 114
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
- Thema
-
public goods
private provision
provision point mechanism
distributional efficiency
collective action problem
Öffentliche Güter
Allokation
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Verteilungswirkung
Asymmetrische Information
Entscheidungstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Zubrickas, Robertas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-75659
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Zubrickas, Robertas
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2013