Arbeitspapier

The provision point mechanism with reward money

We introduce reward money into the provision point mechanism with refunds. Reward money is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only when the provision point is not reached. In environments without aggregate uncertainty, the provision point is always reached in equilibrium as competition for reward money and preference for the public good induce sufficient contributions. Importantly, the mechanism not only ensures allocative efficiency but also distributional. At a specific level of reward money, we obtain a unique equilibrium, where all consumers contribute the same proportion of their private valuations. The advantages of the mechanism are also demonstrated for collective action problems.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 114

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Thema
public goods
private provision
provision point mechanism
distributional efficiency
collective action problem
Öffentliche Güter
Allokation
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Verteilungswirkung
Asymmetrische Information
Entscheidungstheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Zubrickas, Robertas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-75659
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Zubrickas, Robertas
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2013

Ähnliche Objekte (12)