The influence of collusion on price changes: New evidence from major cartel cases

Konferenzbeitrag

In this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Empirical Industrial Organization ; No. G9-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Subject: cartel detection ; collusion ; competition policy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): von Blanckenburg, Korbinian ; Geist, Alexander ; Kholodilin, Konstantin Arkadievich
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (where): Frankfurt a. M.
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37171
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET