The balanced solution for cooperative transferable utility games

Arbeitspapier

The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this contribution we de¯ne the balanced solution which assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. We prove its existence for all monotone transferable utility games, discuss other properties of this solution, and deal with its characterization through a reduced game consistency.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,073

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games
• Subject: Balanced solution ; Proportionality ; Reduced game consistency ; Weight- ed Shapley value ; Shapley-Wert ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Transferable Utility Games ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): van den Brink, René ; Levínský, René ; Zelen, Miroslav
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25639
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET