Arbeitspapier

The Rotten Kid Theorem and Almost Transferable Utility

We assume like Bergstrom (1989) and Dijkstra (2007) that each child’s utility is treated as a normal good in the altruistic head’s utility function, and show that if utility functions lead to Almost Transferable Utility children can manipulate the tradeoff between their own utility and the parent’s utility through their own actions, but they have an incentive to maximize the altruistic head’s utility if the altruistic head also considers children’s utilities as Hicksian substitutes and hence the rotten kid theorem holds. A special class of such altruistic utility functions that treat utilities of children as normal and Hicksian substitutes are the Generalized Utilitarian Welfare functions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5642

Classification
Wirtschaft
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Subject
Rotten Kid Theorem
transferable utility
Hicksian substitutes
fiscal federalism

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gugl, Elisabeth
Leroux, Justin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Gugl, Elisabeth
  • Leroux, Justin
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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