Optimal Timing in Rotten Kid Families

Arbeitspapier

In a family context with endogenous timing, multiple public goods and alternative parental instruments, we show that the optimal timing for the sequential-action game played by rotten kids and a parent depends crucially on whether the kids are homogeneous or heterogeneous. For homogeneous kids, the rotten kid theorem holds irrespective of the parental policy instrument, implying that it is optimal to let the kids to be action leaders. If the kids are heterogeneous, however, parental leadership yields a first best outcome and, hence, it is optimal whenever the kids are economically dependent and agree on the tradeoff between public goods.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6333

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Public Goods
• Thema: rotten kids ; public goods ; endogenous timing ; heterogeneous preferences ; economically dependent

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Faria, João Ricardo ; Silva, Emilson C.D.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155575
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ