Arbeitspapier

An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information

Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another variation concerns the information about the multiplier of donations where we compare the benchmark case with a commonly known multiplier to a condition where the multiplier is known for sure only by donators. Questions which we try to answer are: Will indirect reciprocity induce higher or lower donations?, will donators with the high multiplier hide behind the small one?, how do receivers respond to the different situations?

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,36

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
experiment
reciprocity
Trust
game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dufwenberg, Martin
Gneezy, Uri
Güth, Werner
van Damme, Eric E. C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2000

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047455
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dufwenberg, Martin
  • Gneezy, Uri
  • Güth, Werner
  • van Damme, Eric E. C.
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Entstanden

  • 2000

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