Arbeitspapier

In a world with many targets, one-dimensional target indicators will always be bypassed

It is striking that economists in particular firmly believe in the benefits of rule-binding, even though this belief runs counter to the standard assumption of economic theory that we humans are self-interested and therefore extremely resourceful when it comes to circumventing inconvenient government regulations, e.g. taxes. In Public Choice Theory, politicians are even assumed to have nothing but self-interest as their guiding motive for action. Why then, in this world of thought, should ultra-self-interested politicians of all people adhere to simple rules such as the debt brake instead of bypass them, if - as is also assumed in this model world - all that matters to them is short-term electoral success, for which government debt can be helpful.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1982

Classification
Wirtschaft
History of Economic Thought through 1925: General
History of Economic Thought since 1925: General
Law and Economics: General
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Subject
rule-binding
Champbell
Goodhart's Law
Hobbes

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wagner, Gert G.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wagner, Gert G.
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Time of origin

  • 2021

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