Arbeitspapier
Dynamic reform of public institutions: A model of motivated agents and collective reputation
State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a highreputation institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2015-303r
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- Subject
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Motivated Agents
Institutional Reform
Public Sector
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Valasek, Justin
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Valasek, Justin
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2016
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