Arbeitspapier
Say pays!: Shareholder voice and firm performance
This paper estimates the effect of increasing shareholder voice in corporations through a new governance rule that provides shareholders with a regular vote on pay: Say on Pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to Say on Pay shareholder proposals to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Adopting Say on Pay leads to large increases in market value (5.4 percent), firm profitability, and long-term performance. In contrast, we find small effects on the level and structure of pay. This suggests that Say on Pay operates as a regular confidence vote, increasing efficiency, and market value.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Upjohn Institute Working Paper ; No. 13-192
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Firm Behavior: Theory
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- Thema
-
Agency Cost
Corporate Governance
Shareholder Meetings
Regression Discontinuity
Event Studies
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cuñat, Vicente
Gine, Mireia
Guadalupe, Maria
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
- (wo)
-
Kalamazoo, MI
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.17848/wp13-192
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cuñat, Vicente
- Gine, Mireia
- Guadalupe, Maria
- W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Entstanden
- 2013
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