Arbeitspapier
Say pays!: Shareholder voice and firm performance
This paper estimates the effect of increasing shareholder voice in corporations through a new governance rule that provides shareholders with a regular vote on pay: Say on Pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to Say on Pay shareholder proposals to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Adopting Say on Pay leads to large increases in market value (5.4 percent), firm profitability, and long-term performance. In contrast, we find small effects on the level and structure of pay. This suggests that Say on Pay operates as a regular confidence vote, increasing efficiency, and market value.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Upjohn Institute Working Paper ; No. 13-192
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Firm Behavior: Theory
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- Subject
-
Agency Cost
Corporate Governance
Shareholder Meetings
Regression Discontinuity
Event Studies
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Cuñat, Vicente
Gine, Mireia
Guadalupe, Maria
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
- (where)
-
Kalamazoo, MI
- (when)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.17848/wp13-192
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cuñat, Vicente
- Gine, Mireia
- Guadalupe, Maria
- W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Time of origin
- 2013