Arbeitspapier

Say pays!: Shareholder voice and firm performance

This paper estimates the effect of increasing shareholder voice in corporations through a new governance rule that provides shareholders with a regular vote on pay: Say on Pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to Say on Pay shareholder proposals to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Adopting Say on Pay leads to large increases in market value (5.4 percent), firm profitability, and long-term performance. In contrast, we find small effects on the level and structure of pay. This suggests that Say on Pay operates as a regular confidence vote, increasing efficiency, and market value.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Upjohn Institute Working Paper ; No. 13-192

Classification
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Firm Behavior: Theory
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Subject
Agency Cost
Corporate Governance
Shareholder Meetings
Regression Discontinuity
Event Studies

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cuñat, Vicente
Gine, Mireia
Guadalupe, Maria
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
(where)
Kalamazoo, MI
(when)
2013

DOI
doi:10.17848/wp13-192
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cuñat, Vicente
  • Gine, Mireia
  • Guadalupe, Maria
  • W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Time of origin

  • 2013

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