Arbeitspapier

Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP serves as a regular vote of confidence on the CEO, which leads to higher efficiency and market value.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8538

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
say-on-pay
corporate governance
executive compensation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cuñat, Vicente
Giné, Mireia
Guadalupe, Maria
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cuñat, Vicente
  • Giné, Mireia
  • Guadalupe, Maria
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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