Arbeitspapier
Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP serves as a regular vote of confidence on the CEO, which leads to higher efficiency and market value.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8538
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
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say-on-pay
corporate governance
executive compensation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cuñat, Vicente
Giné, Mireia
Guadalupe, Maria
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cuñat, Vicente
- Giné, Mireia
- Guadalupe, Maria
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2014