Arbeitspapier

Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP serves as a regular vote of confidence on the CEO, which leads to higher efficiency and market value.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8538

Classification
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Subject
say-on-pay
corporate governance
executive compensation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cuñat, Vicente
Giné, Mireia
Guadalupe, Maria
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cuñat, Vicente
  • Giné, Mireia
  • Guadalupe, Maria
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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