Artikel
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually rational payoff sets for this environment, and we prove a folk theorem under imperfect monitoring. Our setting differs significantly from the case considered in previous literature (Dutta (1995), Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011), and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2011)) where players become very patient. In particular, the set of equilibrium payoffs typically depends on the initial state.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 131-173 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
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Stochastic games
folk theorem
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Wiseman, Thomas
Peski, Marcin
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1512
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Wiseman, Thomas
- Peski, Marcin
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2015
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