Arbeitspapier
Merger externalities in oligopolistic markets
We quantify externalities on profitability and market shares of competing firms in oligopolistic markets through the transition from an n to an n - 1 player oligopoly after a merger. Competitors are identified via the European Commission's market investigations and our methodology allows us to distinguish the externality due to the change in market structure from the merger effect. We obtain results consistent with the predictions of standard oligopoly models: rivals expand their output and increase their profits, whereas merging firms are negatively affected. This indicates that on average the market power effects of large mergers outweigh the efficiencies.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1321
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gugler, Klaus
Szücs, Florian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gugler, Klaus
- Szücs, Florian
- Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Entstanden
- 2013